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Wittmann et al. find that we confuse own
performance with the performance of
others, depending on whether we
cooperate or compete with them. This
confusion is reflected in area 9, indicating
it interdependently processes
information about ourselves and others.
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To survive, humans must estimate their own ability
and the abilities of others. We found that, although
people estimated their abilities on the basis of their
ownperformance in a rationalmanner, their estimates
of themselves were partly merged with the perfor-
mance of others. Reciprocally, their ability estimates
for others also reflected their own, as well as the
others’, performance. Self-other mergence operated
in a context-dependent manner: interacting with
high or low performers, respectively, enhanced and
diminished own ability estimates in cooperative con-
texts, but the opposite occurred in competitive
contexts. Self-other mergence not only influenced
subjective evaluations, it also affected how people
subsequently objectively adjusted their performance.
Perigenual anterior cingulate cortex tracked one’s
own performance. Dorsomedial frontal area 9 tracked
others’ performances, but also integrated contextual
and self-related information. Self-other mergence
increasedwith thestrengthof self andother represen-
tations in area 9, suggesting it carries interdependent
representations of self and other.
INTRODUCTION
Social environments require humans and other primates to
monitor others (Chang et al., 2013a, 2013b; Ruff and Fehr,
2014) and to know not only their own abilities, but also the abil-
ities of others. This knowledge guides establishment of social
dominance hierarchies (Zink et al., 2008) and can be linked to
features of brain structure and function (Noonan et al., 2014;
Sallet et al., 2011). It guides animals’ choices in a powerful
way. For example, the decision to engage in fundamental modes
of social interaction such as cooperation or competition with a
conspecific is guided by knowledge about their abilities and so-
cial status relative to one’s own (Wang et al., 2011). Estimating
abilities of both self and others on the basis of past performance
may be particularly important for humans, as they are able to co-
ordinate and execute multi-step tasks such as building a shelter482 Neuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016 ª 2016 The Authors. Publishe
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or making complex decisions in groups (Kerr and Tindale, 2004).
Moreover, they have to use this knowledge flexibly because
social alliances can change very quickly: a competitor within
one’s own company might quickly become a cooperator when
competing with a different company.
It has been a long-standing idea in psychology that humans
derive expectations about whether they will succeed in a given
task from their past task performance (Bandura, 1977). At the
same time, people do not learn about themselves in isolation
but relative to their social environment. Comparisons with other
people can be used as an effective means for self-evaluation
(Festinger, 1954; Mussweiler, 2003), and, conversely, people
base judgments of other people on knowledge of their own traits
(Allport, 1924; Krueger, 2010). However, the social influence on
judgments of self and others can vary. We might be influenced
more strongly by others simply because we like them (Heider,
1958); we might, by default, evaluate members of our own group
more positively than members of a different group (Brewer,
1979), and we might perceive others as more similar to us
when we cooperate with them than when we compete with
them (Toma et al., 2010). In sum, learning about self and others
is often based on all three aspects: objective experience, self/
other comparisons, and the social context.
In the field of neuroscience, we are only beginning to explore
the computational and neural mechanisms that underlie how
people learn about the abilities of other people (Boorman et al.,
2013), but even less is known about how we learn about our
own abilities. Reward-related brain signals scale with the payoff
for oneself relative to the payoff of other people (Fliessbach et al.,
2007). Recently, it has been shown that one’s own choice pref-
erences can be biased toward the observed choice preferences
of other people (Garvert et al., 2015; Nicolle et al., 2012) and that
this depends on the identity of the other person consistent with
psychological theories (Izuma and Adolphs, 2013). However, un-
like choice preferences, where there is no clear right and wrong,
there is often objective information available about our own abil-
ities. For instance, the time one needs to run 100 m ought to be
well predicted by the previous occasions on which one ran 100
m. In this sense, ability judgments can be based on objective
performance feedback attributable unambiguously to ourselves.
Here, we test, first, whether we estimate our abilities from
monitoring our performance over time just as we estimate the





Figure 1. Task Design
(A) Schematic of trial events. On every trial, all players played a minigame, after which parametric performance feedback was provided (upper right; higher bars
indicate better performance) that enabled performance to be learned. Letters indicate subject initials for Self (S; middle position) and two other players. A relevant
(legend continued on next page)
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et al., 2011). We show that the history of an individual’s perfor-
mance is indeed used to estimate their ability. Second, we test
whether ability estimated for oneself is also dependent on the
performance of other people. We find that, surprisingly, the per-
formances of other people also influence individuals’ assess-
ments of their own abilities. When we are cooperating with
someone who performs well, our estimates of our own ability
are inflated, and when we are cooperating with someone who
performs poorly our ability estimates are depressed. Recipro-
cally, the ability of another individual is estimated not only from
the other’s performance, but also from one’s own performance.
We demonstrate that such self-other mergence not only impacts
on people’s subjective evaluation of themselves and others, but
even affects how they subsequently adjust their performance.
We refer to ability estimation for self and others based on their
respective performance history as ‘‘appropriate,’’ while we refer
to the misattribution of past self-related performance when esti-
mating others’ abilities (or other-related performance to estimate
one’s own ability) as self-other mergence (SOM; see Figure 2A
for an illustration).
Human subjects performed an experiment in an MRI scanner.
Distinct regions in medial frontal cortex (Neubert et al., 2015)
tracked the estimated abilities of self (perigenual anterior cingu-
late cortex; pgACC) and other (area 9) (Kelley et al., 2002; Mitch-
ell et al., 2006). SOM increased with the strength of self and other
representations in area 9; its activity predicted both how much
self-judgments were related to the other player, and how much
other judgments were related to one’s own performance. This
suggests that area 9 does not simply represent other people’s
perspectives independently of our own (Amodio and Frith,




On each trial, subjects performed a reaction-time minigame.
They were told that two other players independently performed
the minigame at the same time (Figures S1–S3). We explain
the nature of the minigames in detail in Figure S3. The mini-
games’ precise nature is less critical than the fact that they pro-other (O) was pre-specified on each trial but changed between trials. Ratings andm
cooperative or competitive context.
(B) Trial timeline for an example cooperative trial. Trials start with the presentation o
made about whether to cooperate or not (in this case the subject decided to coop
O-ability ratings. Then all players play a minigame (independent of choice or rating
disparity between the performance average of S and O (9) and the threshold they w
or negative.
(C) Trial timeline for an example competitive trial. Annotations in the figure panel in
choice ismade but now the decision is whether or not to compete. In this case, the
the performance difference of S and O (4) and the threshold (1).
(D) If subjects decided not to cooperate or to compete (avoid choices), they noneth
the context was still displayed (competitive in this example), but no threshold was
subjects either won or lost 1.5 points with equal probability (i.e., the expected v
cooperating or competing (depending on which context was indicated).
(E) Schematic of session timeline. Each trial is characterized by one of two oth
minigames (M1/M2) and has either a cooperative (Coop) or compete (Cmp) so
dorandomly interleaved.
484 Neuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016vided a vehicle to investigate how subjects developed an esti-
mate of their ability that was based on their performance and
how this changed depending on interactions with two other
players whose performances they also saw. On each trial in
the experiment, subjects performed a short trial of a minigame
and parametric feedback about their own performance and the
performance of the other players was provided at the end of
each trial (Figure 1A). Subjects could use the performance feed-
back to form ability estimates for self and the two others over the
course of the experiment.
We used pre-determined performance feedback schedules to
carefully match observed performance for self and others and to
keep them stable across subjects. This ensured that perfor-
mance learning for self and others were comparable and that in-
dividual differences in task behavior were interpretable. Subjects
were told that the performance feedback reflected their objec-
tive performance mapped on a 15-point performance scale
and that the previously established mapping was the same for
all players. Therefore, subjects received explicit and indepen-
dent performance feedback for all players. Using not only one
but two minigames (‘‘time task’’ and ‘‘color task’’) in pseudo-
random trial order made it possible to have, on the one hand,
slowly drifting performance shifts within a minigame (as abilities
are thought to be relatively stable features [Boorman et al., 2013])
but, on the other hand, reduced sequential correlations across
trials (by switching between minigames that were performed at
different levels; Figure 1E) and ensured a full parametric range
of performance feedback, thereby making it possible to perform
event-related fMRI analysis. Finally, having two minigames al-
lowed us to establish the generality of our findings.
Each trial was performed either in a cooperative or a compet-
itive context. For example, on some trials subjects were given
the opportunity to cooperate with one of two other players in
the next run of the minigame (Figure 1B). This meant that their
own performance score and the other player’s performance
score would be summed together, and if it exceeded a threshold
indicated on the screen (varying trialwise), then points were
awarded (which were translated into monetary reward at the
end of the experiment). Subjects could first decide whether to
engage in cooperation or whether to avoid it (engage/avoid de-
cision). If they avoided cooperation, then the points awardedinigames were embedded in engage/avoid decisions that established either a
f S, O, the upcomingminigame, social context, and the threshold. A decision is
erate). After the decision, subjects provided, in randomized order, S-ability and
s). In the feedback phase, the payoff (1 in this instance) is determined by the
ere asked to exceed (10). Payoffs were parametric and could be positive, zero,
dicate elements differing from the cooperative example in (B). Again, an engage
subject chose to compete. Payoff (+3) is determined by the difference between
eless went on tomake ratings and performminigames. In the feedback phase,
shown, and the payoff was independent of performance scores. On such trials,
alue was zero). Hence, choices should only depend on the expected value of
er players having the role of relevant other (O1/O2) and one of two possible
cial context. All three trial features were experimenter determined and pseu-
were randomly distributed around zero. The other player was
pre-specified on each trial and is referred to as ‘‘relevant other’’
(O) as opposed to the ‘‘self’’ (S). Specifying only one of the other
players asOon any given trial, and changing this from trial to trial,
also helped reduce sequential dependencies between perfor-
mance estimates on successive trials. Whether or not a subject
collaborates on any trial should depend on the subject’s esti-
mate of their own ability, their estimate of the other player’s abil-
ity, and the threshold that has to be reached.
On other trials, subjects were given the opportunity to
compete the relevant other, O, in the next run of the minigame
(Figure 1C). This meant that the difference between their own
performance score and the other player’s performance score
would be taken, and if it exceeded a threshold indicated on the
screen, then points were awarded. Subjects could first decide
whether to engage in competition or whether to avoid it
(engage/avoid decision). If they avoided competition then the
points awarded were randomly distributed around zero. Again,
which of the two other players was O varied from trial to trial.
And again, whether or not a subject competes should depend
on the subject’s estimate of their own ability, their estimate of
the other player’s ability, and the threshold score that has to
be reached.
In summary, the engage/avoid decision created either a coop-
erative or a competitive relationship between S andO;O became
either an ally or an opponent for S on that trial (Figures 1B and
1C). The context varied pseudorandomly across trials making
sure that slowly drifting ability estimates were comparable be-
tween competitive and cooperative trials. Importantly, the inclu-
sion of the engage/avoid decision and the threshold enabled us
to distinguish S and O related brain activity from brain activity
related to reward processing.
So that we could measure subjects’ absolute ability estimates,
subjects were asked on each trial to rate the performance they
expected for the current trial for themselves (S-ability) and the
relevant other (O-ability; Figures 1A–1C). S-ability and O-ability
were assessed via two independent ratings (in random order)
prior to performing the minigame. Having the ability ratings
embedded in either a cooperative or a competitive context al-
lowed us to test whether past performance of S and O had differ-
ential effects on theO-ability and S-ability, respectively. We used
ratings in which subjects rated the players relative to a rating
marker, which was updated over trials using a staircasing proce-
dure (see ‘‘Ability ratings’’ in Experimental Procedures) to maxi-
mize both informativeness and speed of the ratings (and there-
fore trial number and statistical power). The inclusion of two
different other players who took turns to be the relevant other
in a trial ensured that S’s and O’s performance feedback and
associated ability estimates were statistically decorrelated al-
lowing identification of neural correlates in an unconfounded
manner (Figure S5A).
Appropriate Ability Estimation and Self-OtherMergence
We analyzed rating and decision data using logistic general
linear models (GLMs) applied first to each subject separately
and then averaged resulting regression weights (beta weights)
across subjects (Figure 2). After testingwhether both ability judg-
ments in the rating data and engage/avoid choices were basedon the previous performances of the appropriate players, we
went on to investigate self-other mergence (Figure 2A).
First, we tested which information subjects used to estimate
self and others’ abilities. Analysis of the rating data showed
that S-ability and O-ability were based on the performance his-
tory of S and O, respectively. This indicates that subjects indeed
used performance feedback to generate predictions about their
subsequent minigame performance (Figures 2B-i and 2C-i).
Recent performance feedback was predictive of subjects S
and O ratings. However, performance that had occurred more
remotely in time had much less of an impact on the subjects’
ability estimates. This finding that recent and remote events
have greater and lesser impacts, respectively, is similar to the
finding that action value estimates are based more on recent
reward in reinforcement-type learning (Sutton and Barto,
1998). Therefore, to summarize the performance histories that
subjects had observed, we fitted a standard reinforcement
learning (RL) model individually for each subject (Supplemental
Experimental Procedures 1).S-performance andO-performance
from the RL models were estimates of expected performance
and represented recency-weighted averages of the performance
feedback (not the true performance) of S and O.
Next, we examined whether S-performance and O-perfor-
mance from the RL models predicted decisions to engage in
cooperation/competition. We found that a better S-performance
increased the likelihood of cooperating and competing, while
a better O-performance led to increased cooperation and
decreased competition (Figure 2D). The third factor, the
threshold that subjects had to exceed on each trial, not surpris-
ingly also influenced behavior; a higher threshold led to less
engagement in both cooperative and competitive contexts. As
incentivized by the experimental design, subjects’ engage rates
were around 70% (Figure 2D-ii), andwe found a slight preference
for cooperation compared to competition (t23 = 3.82; p < 0.01).
This preference might be related to the experiment’s payoff
structure. However, it is also consistent with suggestions that a
normative cooperative bias exists in social interactions promot-
ing cooperation over selfish behavior (Boyd and Richerson,
2009). This shows that choices when to cooperate and when
to compete, like the subjects’ ability ratings, were strongly based
on the previous performances of S and O. It also indicates that
our competition/cooperate manipulation had the expected
impact on subjects’ behavior: subjects preferred to cooperate
with high performers and to compete with low performers, as
they should indeed have done in order to maximize their reward
in the experiment.
Finally, we investigated whether subjects’ own ability esti-
mates were also related to O’s past performance. We focused
our analysis of SOM on trials where subjects chose to
engage in cooperation or competition. Controlling for S-perfor-
mance, we assessed the influence of O-performance on
S-ability. To do this, we tested whether, in a GLM which con-
tained factors indexing past performance of S, past performance
of O were predictive of subjects S-ability ratings. Specifically,
we tested whether S-ability judgments were indeed biased
toward the performance levels of O in cooperation, but
away from them in competition. We found that, indeed, during




Figure 2. Behavioral Results
Blue and red indicate cooperation and competition
trials in all panels.
(A) Schematic of appropriate ability estimation and
self-other mergence (SOM) (i). Letters on arrows
refer to subsequent panels showing analysis of
appropriate ability estimates (B-i and C-i) and SOM
effects (B-ii and C-ii). S-ability and O-ability refers
to trialwise ratings of oneself (S) and relevant other
(O). (ii) Illustration of a context-dependent SOM
effect where O’s past performance influences
S-ability estimates. S-ability estimates are inflated
or depressed when O’s performance history has
been, respectively, good or poor in cooperative
contexts. However, the inverse is the case in
competition: good performers decrease S-ability
estimates. Positive and negative beta weights
in B-ii (and analogously for O-ability in C-ii) reflect
the increasing and decreasing slopes in this
illustration.
(B and C) Agent appropriate estimation of ability in
(B-i) and (C-i): S-ability and O-ability on trial t were
based on recent S and O performance feedback,
respectively. Panels showbeta weights of a logistic
GLM, applied to each subject and averaged over
subjects (same for subsequent panels). Ratings
were more strongly based on the recent perfor-
mance feedback received by the appropriate
player (i.e., S-ability ratings reflect S’s past per-
formance and O-ability ratings reflect O’s past
performance). SOM of performance in (B-ii) and
(C-ii): we found an influence of O-performance on
S-ability, controlling for the effect of S-perfor-
mance. This effect reversed with social context
such that the estimation of one’s own ability was
either inflated (in cooperation) or depressed (in
competition) when paired with a high performer.
Similarly, S-performance influenced estimates of
O-ability, controlling for the influence of O-perfor-
mance (significant SOMint; p values for both ana-
lyses calculated in an interaction analysis from
Figure S4A; same y axes as in (i). Note that different
GLMs were used for (i) and (ii) (see main text and
Experimental Procedures).
(D) Engage/avoid decisions. (i) S-performance,
O-performance, and threshold influenced de-
cisions to cooperate or compete in a rational
manner. In particular, O is weighted in reverse
fashion depending on whether O is an ally in a
cooperative context or an opponent in a competi-
tive context. (ii) Rate of engage choices for coop-
erative (‘‘Coop.’’) and competitive (‘‘Comp.’’) trials
(error bars are mean ± SEM).O-performance: independent of subjects’ own performance,
subjects evaluated themselves more positively when the other
player performed well and more negatively when the other per-
formed badly. This was reversed in competition: subjects evalu-
ated themselves more negatively when competing with a high
compared to a low performer, as demonstrated by an interaction486 Neuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016effect (SOMint(O/S), t23 = 3.39; p = 0.0025; see Figure S4A for
full details and summary in Figure 2B-ii). We found O-ability was
influenced by S-performance in a complementary manner (SO-
Mint(S/O), t23 = 3.21; p = 0.0039; see Figure S4A for full details
and summary in Figure 2C-ii). The two SOM effects persisted
both when using estimates of S’s and O’s performance history








0 40 6 3.98
Precuneus 6 64 18 3.38
O-performance Brodmann area 9 2 44 36 3.43
Family-wise error cluster corrected, z > 2.5, p < 0.05.that were not based on RL models and also in analyses that
included the trials where subjects decided to avoid cooperation
or competition (even though on such trials the relation to Omight
be less important, Figures S4B and S4C). Therefore, ability esti-
mates for self and other were interdependent; SOM occurred
both when judging oneself and the other individual.Neural Correlates of Appropriate Ability Estimation and
Self-Other Mergence
In close correspondence to the behavioral analysis, we tested,
first, whether there were brain regions encoding ability estimates
for self and relevant other. Having identified such regions, we
went on to test whether self and other signals were related to
the appropriate attribution of past performance to the relevant
player (S-performance to S and O-performance to O) or whether
they indicated a misattribution between self and other. For all
MRI analyses, we used a single GLM (see Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures 3.3 for details).
In order to identify regions tracking performance history, we
focused on the decision phase and used a GLM very similar to
the one used in the behavioral choice analysis (Figure S5; Table
1). This allowed us to distinguish between brain signals related to
the self, the relevant other, and the variable threshold subjects
had to exceed to win points on each trial (Figure S5A). Activity
in perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (pgACC) reflected sub-
jects’ own recent performance history (Figure 3A-i); it increased
and decreased depending on how well subjects had themselves
performed recently (and therefore how likely they are to perform
well on the next trial). This S-performance signal in pgACC did
not simply reflect individual choice values; it was present even
after partialing out reward expected on a given trial (Figures
S5B and S5C). Such an analysis was possible because the
experimental design meant that on any trial reward expectation
was only partly a function of S-performance (in addition it also
depended on the threshold and O-performance, in different
ways on cooperative and competitive trials).
In contrast, area 9 tracked O-performance history (Figure 3A-
ii; Figures S5B and S5C), reflecting how well the relevant other is
expected to perform in the minigames. Area 9 is part of the ‘‘the-
ory of mind’’ network (Saxe, 2006) and is active during other-
directed behavior (Sul et al., 2015). However, the effect ofO-per-
formance that we found in area 9 was a basic other performance
tracking signal and as such is unlikely to reflect only emotional or
motivational responses to the other player that vary as a function
of context. As such, the O-performance signal could be distin-guished from activity more generally related to O. For instance,
area 9 and other nodes of the ‘‘theory of mind’’ network were
also more active at the times when subjects rated the relevant
other (Figure S5B-ii). Overall, the pattern of performance related
signals was different in area 9 compared to pgACC (Figures S5C-
ii and S5C-iii).
In all subsequent analyses, we focused on the same two re-
gions of interest (ROIs) using the same GLM as used on the
whole-brain level (although based on the same trials as in the
behavioral analysis, Figures 2B-ii and 2C-ii) using time course
analysis. To relate brain signals to behavior, we employed a
two-step inference process considering only variables that
were related specifically to past performance. First, we assessed
whether an ROI carried a significant signal for a given regressor.
Second, only if this was the case, we tested whether individual
variation in the brain signal at the group peak was related to in-
dividual variation in behavior by correlating it with the respective
behavioral beta weight from the self or other rating. We began
by examining our main variables of interest: S-performance
and O-performance.
We found that S-performance signal in pgACC predicted how
much S-performance determined S-ability across subjects (Fig-
ure 3B-i; r = 0.55; p = 0.0053). Hence, pgACC signals reflected
the use of information for estimating one’s own abilities, inde-
pendent of others. We found no other performance related rep-
resentations of self and other in pgACC.
In contrast to pgACC, the O-performance signal in area 9
did not predict how much ability estimates of O were guided by
O-performance (r = 0.07; p = 0.74). Instead, it predicted the de-
gree to which subjects’ S-ability decreased as a function of
engaging with a strong other player (Figure 3B-ii; r = 0.48; p =
0.0177). Thismeans that subjectswith a stronger neural represen-
tation of the relevant other’s past performance in area 9 rated their
own ability more negatively the better the relevant other performs.
At a behavioral level, this corresponded to the tendency forO-per-
formance to have a negative main effect on S-ability (the average
effect of the two bars in Figures 2B-ii and S4A). The generally
negative effect of O-performance on S-ability becomes apparent
when considering only subjects with the strongest O-perfor-
mance signals in area 9 (t11 =2.5; p = 0.0293; Figure 3B-ii, right;
median split of subjects). Therefore, area 9 activity reflected SOM
in the estimation of the abilities of oneself.
To investigate whether area 9 was generally related to SOM,
we examined whether such an effect was also present in the
other direction: that past S-performance was used to estimate
O-ability. In addition to O-performance signals, area 9 also car-
ried an S-performance signal that was stronger in competition
than in cooperation (interaction effect; t23 = 2.93; p = 0.008; Fig-
ure 3A-iii). This was consistent with our finding that area 9 was
generally more active when there was a competitive relationship
between S andO thanwhen there was a cooperative relationship
(main effect of context; Figure S5B-iii). We went on to test
whether these self-related performance representations were
also linked to SOM. Indeed, we found that S-performance influ-
enced O-ability via area 9: the neural S-performance effect in
area 9 (Figure 3A-iii) was predictive of the influence exerted by
S-performance on O-ability shown in Figure 2C-ii (Figure 3B-iii;
r = 0.43; p = 0.0341). In other words, the neural signature ofNeuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016 487
A B Figure 3. fMRI Results
Whole-brain effects family-wise error cluster cor-
rected, z > 2.5, p < 0.05.
(A) Activation foci for S-performance in pgACC (i,
yellow) and O-performance in area 9 (ii, blue). Area
9 showedmore diverse social signals; a contextual
S-performance signal was observed, which was
stronger in competition than in cooperation (iii).
The beta time course shows the context-depen-
dent difference in S-performance (red line in-
dicates signal group peak where beta weights
were taken for correlations with behavior).
(B) Relationship between neural and behavioral
effects. (i) In pgACC, across-subjects variability in
S-performance signal reflected the influence of
S-performance on S-ability. (ii, left) By contrast,
variation in area 9 O-performance signal was
not related to the degree subjects based O-ability
on O-performance; instead, it predicted the
average influence of O-performance on S-ability
(SOMmain(O/S)). Note the behavioral variable
plotted on the ordinate corresponds to the average
effect (across cooperation and competition) of
O-performance on S-ability (see Figure 2B-ii). (ii,
right) In other words, only subjects with high
O-performance signal showed a negative effect of
O-performance on S-ability (median split; same y
axis as on the left). (iii, left) The strength of the
contextual S-performance effect in area 9 (A-iii)
predicted the degree to which O-ability was influ-
enced by S-performance in a context-dependent
manner (SOMint(S/O) from Figure 2C-ii on y axis).
(iii, right) Again, only subjects with higher S-per-
formance interaction signals showed the corre-
sponding behavioral effect of S-performance on
O-ability (median split; same y axis as on the left)
(error bars are mean ± SEM).S-performance in area 9 was different depending on context,
and this difference predicted the context-dependent effect of
S-performance on O-ability (SOMint(S/O)).
In sum, we found that, at a first approximation, self and other
signals were found in distinct brain regions (pgACC and area 9),
but further investigation revealed area 9 contained more diverse
social signals relating also to oneself but within the social
context. We found two SOM effects in area 9 that indicate that
it is those subjects with stronger self and other related activity
that are prone to SOM (Figures 3B-ii and 3B-iii, right panels, sta-
tistics embedded in figure). The findings were specific to area 9
(Figure S5C). Therefore, the stronger the representation of the
other in area 9, the more the judgment of one’s own ability de-
pended also on the other’s performance; analogously, the
strength of area 9 self-related representations predicted how
much they influenced the estimation of other’s abilities.
Behavioral Adjustments Driven by Self-Other Mergence
in Area 9
Finally, we investigated whether self-other mergence had an
impact beyond the subjective estimates of abilities reported by
subjects and tested whether its influence even propagated to
behavior, and, if so, whether such an effect could also be related
to area 9.488 Neuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016We used the trial wise change in subjects’ performance,
regardless of direction (S-pChange; Figure 4A) as an index of
feedback driven behavior strategy adjustment from one trial
involving a given minigame to the next trial with the same mini-
game. Note that S-pChange refers to the change in true perfor-
mance, whereas S-performance andO-performance summarize
the performance feedback observed. Subjects changed their
performance in the minigames (for better or worse) more after
negative performance feedback for S (t23 = 2.34, p = 0.0281).
However, they also changed their performance more after nega-
tive feedback for O in cooperative trials, while in competition they
changed their performance more after more positive feedback
for O (O-influence on S-pChange; t23 = 2.25, p = 0.0346; see Fig-
ure S6 for full details and summary in Figure 4B). This means that
the performance feedback, displayed for the relevant other after
a minigame, had an impact on how subjects performed the mini-
game themselves when they encountered it the next time. There-
fore, subjects used the performance feedback pertaining to the
other to adjust their own behavior.
We tested whether this behavioral SOM effect was again
mediated by area 9 using an ROI analysis (coordinates taken
from previous analysis). This final part of the analyses was spe-
cifically intended as a replication of previous SOM effects. We
used the same GLM as before, focusing on the feedback phase
AC D
B Figure 4. Self-Other Mergence in Minigame
Performance Adjustments
(A) Illustration of S-pChange reflecting the absolute
(i.e., unsigned) difference in true minigame per-
formance from one trial to the next of the same
minigame. S-pChange constitutes an index of how
much subjects changed their true minigame per-
formance as a function of performance feedback.
(B) Subjects’ performance adjustments were
guided by their own performance feedback.
S-pChange increased with more negative perfor-
mance feedback (see main text). However,
O performance feedback exerted an additional
influence on S-pChange. It influenced S-pChange
in a manner that paralleled its influence on S-ability
(Figure 2; p value from Figure S6A).
(C) BOLD activity in area 9 in the feedback
phase of trials was related to the magnitude of
S-pChange that would ensue from the current to
the next trial (main effect). It also scaled negatively
with a prediction error for O (O-PE). ROI taken from
Figure 3A-ii.
(D) Subjects with stronger (more negative) O-PE in area 9 were more influenced by O performance feedback in their subsequent minigame performance (left). As
in the earlier results, SOM occurred only in subjects with stronger area 9 signal (median split; same y axis as on the left) (error bars are mean ± SEM).this time (Figure S5D). Again, we first aimed to identify activity
related to the relevant other’s performance in area 9 and only
subsequently to relate such activity to how much subjects
were biased by the other player. First, we tested whether area
9 could play a role in preparing behavioral adjustments from trial
to trial. We found that, indeed, in the feedback phase of the trial,
activity in area 9 was correlated with the extent that subjects
changed their performance from the current trial to the next trial
(main effect S-pChange; Figure 4C). Second, at the same time,
we found a negative signal scaling with the size of the (signed)
prediction error for the relevant other (O-PE; Figure 4C). O-PE in-
dexed how much the observed performance feedback for O
deviated from subjects’ expectation of O’s performance level
(Suzuki et al., 2012). Third, variation in O-PE signal predicted
variation in O-influence on S-pChange (Figure 4D; r = 0.43, p =
0.0369). This replicates our previous findings linking area 9 to
self-other mergence: the strength of other-related performance
signals in area 9 predicted how much subjects’ adjusted their
own performance as a function of the other player’s performance
feedback.
DISCUSSION
People learn about themselves from objective experience (Ban-
dura, 1977), but their judgments are also deeply influenced by
the social environment (Allport, 1924; Festinger, 1954). In our
experiment, we show that both mechanisms occur when
learning about the abilities of self and others. Subjects form es-
timates of how well they themselves and others do based on
explicit performance feedback. However, these estimates are
not separate but influence each other reciprocally. Subjects sys-
tematically overestimated their abilities when cooperating with a
good partner compared to a bad one, and the reverse was true in
competition. Also, others were estimated as more similar in abil-
ity to oneself in cooperation but dissimilar to oneself in competi-tion. Such interdependence could be described as ‘‘anchoring’’
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) self and other judgments to each
other in cooperation but as the reverse in competition. Two adja-
cent areas in medial prefrontal cortex, pgACC and area 9, track
self and other performance, respectively. Area 9 moreover inte-
grated multiple signals relating also to the self and the context,
and it predicted the degree to which self and other abilities
were estimated in an interdependent fashion.
PgACC signals tracked subjects’ own performance. This area
was previously found when subjects judged whether a given trait
related to themselves (Denny et al., 2012; Kelley et al., 2002) and
when mentalizing about oneself and similar other people (Mitch-
ell et al., 2006) even when controlling for the effects of likeability
(Mobbs et al., 2009). In our study, pgACC activity increased and
decreased according to how well subjects thought they would
perform in the experiment (S-performance signal; Figure 3). For
subjects with a stronger S-performance signal in pgACC, perfor-
mance history more strongly governed estimates of their own
ability. Activity in other brain areas has been associated with ac-
tion values, but our findings indicate that activity in pgACC re-
flects the assignment of ability, or a general value, to the self
rather than the value of a particular choice (Figures S5B and
S5C). Such representations in pgACC might be used to predict
whether one is capable of succeeding in a given endeavor (Ban-
dura, 1977) and as such might be subjectively perceived as
rewarding in themselves. This idea is consistent with recent
findings that regions in anterior cingulate cortex are related to
the physical costs monkeys are willing to endure in order to
obtain reward (Amemori and Graybiel, 2012). Moreover, such
value assignments to the self (rather than value assignment to
specific choices) may be altered in psychological syndromes
such as depression (Murray et al., 2011). Note also that using
predetermined and well-controlled performance feedback was
critical for our investigation of feedback-guided ability learning
as it decoupled feedback-guided learning about oneself fromNeuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016 489
Figure 5. Self-Other Mergence and Interdependent Self and Other
Representations in Area 9
In our study, pgACC holds a representation of oneself that is related to
observing one’s own performance (Figure 3). It may reflect the value of one’s
own actions for earning future reward or overcoming challenges. This ability
estimate may be lower or higher depending on the state the individual is in
(indicated by smaller and bigger ‘‘S’’). In contrast, signals in dorsomedial area 9
suggest a different function. Area 9 holds a representation of the self, too;
however, it is embedded in the cooperative or competitive context (Figure 3A-
iii). In addition, it integrates information about the ability of others (Figure 3A-ii)
and the social relationship one has with them (Figure S5B-iii). A neural circuit
that integrates such information might be useful to facilitate coordination be-
tween oneself and others and allow, for instance, the pursuit of shared goals. It
might also be used to flexibly compute one’s statuswithin one’s social network
as circumstances change (blue and red connections indicate changing alli-
ances and rivalries, varying in strength). This would enable humans and ani-
mals to assign values to self and others based on the dynamics of their social
relationship—something that very vividly guides choice in the complex
dominance hierarchies of monkeys. If this is the case, then self-other
mergence might accompany these neural processes in area 9 (Figure 3)
occurring as a byproduct of relational self and other representations held by
this brain region.introspective (meta-cognitive) estimation of one’s own abilities
(Bahrami et al., 2010; De Martino et al., 2013).
In contrast to pgACC, area 9 signals were more complex.
There were clear signals relating to representation of the other.
For example area 9 was active at the time point that subjects
made ratings of the relevant other and more specifically it
tracked other-related performance estimates and prediction er-
rors (Figures 3 and 4). Activity in area 9 has been found frequently
in previous studies when trait judgments were made about other
people (Denny et al., 2012) and mentalizing about dissimilar
others (Mitchell et al., 2006). In our study there were, however,
also signals relating to self and the social relationship with the
other. Individual differences in area 9 activity indicated how
much self/other information was used in a relational way, pre-
dicting SOM both toward the self and toward the other.
This sheds light on the function area 9 may have in social
cognition. Self-othermergencemight reflect difficulties that arise
from tracking and assigning both self- and other-related informa-
tion to the appropriate agent. In this sense, the effects we report
are reminiscent of failures of credit assignment to the appro-
priate choice during reward-guided learning (Chau et al., 2015;
Thorndike, 1911, 1933; Walton et al., 2010). However, self-other
mergencemay also be a side-product of relational computations
in area 9 (Figure 5). In our experiment, the cooperative and490 Neuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016competitive contexts create a social relationship between self
and other that subjects need to be aware of. This meant that ex-
pectations of success in a trial were not a result of one’s own
anticipated performance alone, but they were also dependent
on the predicted performance of another player as well. Taking
into account the actions of oneself in concert with another per-
son’s actions is not a trivial matter (Tomasello et al., 2005), and
it has been argued that coordinating actions between self and
other often relies on implicit agreements (Misyak et al., 2014).
It might be that self-other mergence indexes the relational repre-
sentations that are used in many social situations where out-
comes are the consequence of joint actions (Seo et al., 2014),
possibly even if oneself is only a passive observer. From this
perspective, when cooperating with a weak partner, the reduced
chances of achieving a shared goal as a team might be carried
over to impact negatively on one’s judgment of oneself. Note,
however, that the strength of the direction of influence of self-
other mergence (self to other or other to self) may depend on
the social situation and other constraints. Furthermore, area 9
may integrate self, other, and relational information to compute
one’s own position in a social network when an individual’s sta-
tus is a reflexion of its alliances (Schu¨lke et al., 2010). In mon-
keys, area 9 is related to dominance (Neubert et al., 2015;
Noonan et al., 2014; Sallet et al., 2011), and thus adoption of a
place in a social hierarchy might reflect the operation of a rela-
tional mechanism that could be performed in area 9.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Twenty-six subjects participated in the experiment. Two were excluded from
data analysis due to excessive motion (final sample: 24 subjects; nine female;
aged 19–31). All provided informed consent. The study was approved by the
ethics committee of the University of Oxford (MSD-IDREC-C1-2013-133).
Subjects received £35 as a show-up fee and a bonus based on task perfor-
mance (range: £4.50–£11.80).
Experimental Design and Schedule
While lying in the MRI scanner, on each trial, subjects performed a minigame.
They were led to believe that two other subjects played the same minigame
simultaneously (Figure 1; Figures S1–S3). Each trial took place either in a coop-
erative or in a competitive social context. Subjects thenmade an engage/avoid
decision. On some trials, the choice was between cooperating or refraining
from cooperating, while in other trials the choice was between competing or
refraining from competing. If subjects took the ‘‘avoid’’ choice, then that meant
that they were simply awarded a small number of points (1.5 points) randomly
distributed around zero (and they were informed that this was the case). How-
ever, if they took the ‘‘engage’’ decision in the cooperative context, then they
opted to ally themselves with one of the other players (which one varied from
trial to trial and was indicated by the experimenter on each trial and is subse-
quently referred to as the relevant other, O) to see whether together they could
performwell enough for their average points to exceed a threshold level (which
varied from trial to trial). If they did, they gained reward points on that trial, but if
they fell short of the threshold they lost points. By contrast, if they took the
‘‘engage’’ decision in the competitive context, then the other player became
an opponent. The difference between the subject’s and opponent’s perfor-
mances then had to exceed a threshold (again the threshold was variable),
and the payoff was proportional to this difference (i.e., a win, a loss or neither
of the two). In summary, the social context was critical when decisions to
engage were made. Reward outcomes for engage/avoid choices were deter-
mined by minigame performances of S, O, and a threshold that varied unpre-
dictably from trial to trial.
Engage PayoffCompetition = ðfeedbackS  feedbackOÞ  threshold
(Equation 1a)
Engage PayoffCooperation = ðfeedbackS + feedbackOÞ=2 threshold
(Equation 1b)
‘‘Feedback’’ in Equations 1a and 1b refers to performance feedback. The
timing of events within each trial is illustrated in Figure 1.
While the likely performance feedback for S and O could be estimated from
performance feedback on previous trials, the threshold varied unpredictably
from trial to trial and was used to dissociate reward expectation from perfor-
mance expectation and to make sure that subjects did not make their choices
before the beginning of the current trial. Subjects found the meaning of the
thresholds intuitive when the task was being explained to them, and their
task behavior confirmed that they had understood the task.
Subjects then also provided an estimate of their ability on each trial by rating
the expected performance for themselves (S) and the relevant other (O) for the
upcoming trial of the minigame (Figure S2B). The order of S and O ratings was
randomized across trials. As explained above, although both of the two other
players performed the minigame simultaneously, subjects were only paired (to
compete or cooperate) with one of the other players (the relevant other, O).
Therefore, only O, and not the third player, was relevant for a trial’s engage/
avoid decision. However, the identity of O switched between trials. On each
trial, after the minigame, subjects received performance feedback about
themselves as well as about the performances of the other two players (Fig-
ure S2A). As minigames, we designed two short reaction-time-based tasks.
See Figure S3 for details on the minigames. The goal of the subjects in the
experiment was to collect as many rewards (points) as possible, as these
were translated into monetary reward at the end of the experiment.
For all three players, including the subjects themselves, performance feed-
back on every trial was predefined (Figure S1A). In other words, the feedback
about performance was independent from subjects’ actual performance in the
minigames (see, however, ‘‘false-start trials’’ for a case of veridical perfor-
mance feedback in the ‘‘Feedback’’ section of the Experimental Procedures
and Figure S2C). This was necessary to control and match performance feed-
back between subjects as well as between subjects and the two other players.
Subjects were told that the minigames had been tested on a larger sample of
subjects and that performance feedback in the minigame reflected individual
performance relative to that sample.
In the phases before and after the minigames, three scales ranging from 1 to
15 points were shown with the initials of the three players below. Performance
feedback was displayed on these scales in the feedback phase. While the ini-
tials of the confederates were the same for all experimental sessions, the sub-
jects’ own initials were adjusted to be appropriate for each individual subject.
The initials created a social frame for the experiment without using explicitly
social cues such as faces.
The experimental schedule contained 136minigame trials. The design was a
2(social context)3 2(partner)3 2(minigame) fully crossed design (17 trials per
cell). This meant that a trial could be either cooperative or competitive (social
context: cooperation or competition), the O could be either ‘‘player’’ 1 or 2 (O:
Other1 or Other2), and, in each trial, subjects played one of two minigames
(minigame: time task or color task). The trial type order was pseudorandom
and the same for all subjects. Three subjects performed a marginally short-
ened version of the schedule. They did the first 116 trials of the schedule; how-
ever, the design was still fully crossed (14 trials per cell).
Several features of the experiment were counterbalanced independently
across subjects to avoid confounds. The mapping between minigame (time
task or color task), and associated performance feedback schedule was coun-
terbalanced. Moreover, as the left/right sides of the buttons used to indicate
the engage/avoid choice were fixed for each subject, they were counterbal-
anced across subjects. We also counterbalanced the screen location where
initials of each confederate were displayed (left or right of subjects’ initials,
which were always in the middle), and association between confederates
(whom the subjects had met before going into the scanner) and their perfor-
mance feedback schedules.
Thus, in summary, all trials comprised an engage/avoid decision, two binary
ratings (for S and O), a minigame phase (described in detail in Figure S3), and afeedback phase. Timing details for all phases (except minigame phases) are
shown in Figure S2.
Experimental Procedures
The experimental procedure was precisely scripted and involved two experi-
menters, two confederates, and the radiographer to make subjects believe
they would be playing an interactive game together with two other subjects.
The same twoconfederates pretended to be the twoother players for every sub-
ject. Details about the task instructions are presented in Figure S1B. The task in
the MRI scanner took approximately 55 min. After functional and structural MRI
sessions, subjects filled in two short questionnaires and were then fully de-
briefed about the experiment. No subject indicated any suspicion about false
performance feedback or the identity of the confederates before debriefing.
Supporting results from a debriefing questionnaire are shown in Figure S1C.
Note that we have several indications (and no counter-indications) that sub-
jects’ ability estimates were guided by the performance feedback and there-
fore that subjects found the feedback credible: the effects of past performance
feedback on (1) S-ability and O-ability ratings, (2) on decisions to engage in
cooperation/competition (both Figure 2), (3) on true minigame performance
(Figure 4), and (4) subjects’ self-reports of the feedback credibility in a debrief-
ing interview, documented by a debriefing questionnaire (Figure S1).
Ability Ratings
As already mentioned subjects provided S and O ability ratings. For each rat-
ing, initially, a tick indicated a value on the performance scale (rating marker)
and subjects indicated whether expected performance (for S or O as appro-
priate) would surpass or fall below the rating marker (Figure S2B). A positive
rating (i.e., performance is expected to be above the rating marker) was
made with one button, and a negative rating (i.e., performance is expected
to be below the rating marker) was made with the other button. As perfor-
mance feedback was always expressed in integers, the rating makers were al-
ways set between two integers (X.5 values). The rating marker was updated
from trial to trial based on the rating choices for the respective player using
a staircasing procedure to increase sensitivity of the ratings. A positive rating
resulted in an increase of the rating marker’s value by one point in the next trial
of the same minigame for the given player; a negative rating resulted in a
decrease by one point. The value of the rating marker on the first trial after
the starter trials (see below) was based on the player’s mean performance
feedback in the starter trials.
Subjects received a small payoff for the accuracy of the ratings. To reduce
incentives to perform badly on the minigames, negative ratings never yielded
payoffs. For positive ratings, subjects won or lost 0.25 points depending on
whether the subsequent performance feedback received surpassed or fell
below the ratingmarker. Note that themagnitude of the rating payoff was insig-
nificant compared to the payoff for the engage/avoid decision.
Feedback
Feedback was chunked together in three components that were presented in
randomized order. The first component was the performance feedback for S
and O, which was presented simultaneously with the information about the ac-
curacy of the subjects’ ratings (Figure S2B). The second component was the
payoff of the engage/avoid decision. For this, a cue indicating the trial’s choice
appeared on the right side of the screen (Figure S2A) together with circles rep-
resenting coins that were won (yellow circles with a plus sign) or lost (red
circles with a minus sign). At the same time, only for engage choices, the per-
formance feedback average (cooperation trials) or performance feedback dif-
ference (competition trials) was displayed on the scales on the right side of the
screen. The third component was the performance feedback of the other
player that was not the O (irrelevant other). The initials of this player were dis-
played in a different color, and the performance was irrelevant for any payoff.
The three feedback components appeared in random order to control for
sequence effects. The first component occurred after 1 s, the second compo-
nent 1.25 s later, the third component another 1.25 s later, and the feedback
phase ended after a further 4 s. Then, after 0.5- to 2.5-s inter-trial interval
(ITI) with a blank screen, the next trial started.
Two types of trials deviated from the described structure. First, the first four
trials of the experiment were ‘‘starter trials’’ (twowith the time task, twowith theNeuron 91, 482–493, July 20, 2016 491
in color task). Those trials were for subjects to form initial ability estimates
about the players. For this reason, in starter trials, there was no option to coop-
erate or compete, and no ability ratings were made. Second, for trials where
subjects performed very badly in a minigame (‘‘false starts’’), the feedback
phase was adjusted. The performance thresholds for false-start trials are dis-
cussed in Figure S3. In false-start trials, subjects received no performance
feedback for themselves, but only for the other players (Figure S2C; Figure S6B
shows the number of false-start trials per subject). The sole payoff for false-
start trials was a loss of two points independent of subjects’ ratings and
engage/avoid choice. Subjects were instructed about this. It was explained
that extremely bad performances would be detected by the computer running
the experiment and discarded as false starts to sort out performance slips that
were, for instance, due to inattentiveness and did not reflect a player’s ‘‘true’’
performance. This procedure was used to make the pre-determined feedback
in other trials more believable as the feedback in false-start trials was actually
determined by true minigame performance. Note that subjects were also told
during the instructions that there would be a special type of false-start trial if
one of the other players performed very badly. However, this never happened
in the experiment. Starter trials and the feedback phase of false-start trials
were excluded from fMRI analysis.
Reinforcement Learning Model
See Supplemental Experimental Procedures 1 for details on the RL model.
Behavioral Analysis
See Supplemental Experimental Procedures 2 for details on behavioral data
analysis.
Imaging Analyses
See Supplemental Experimental Procedures 3 and Figure S5 for details onMRI
data acquisition and analysis.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
six figures, and one table and can be found with this article online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2016.06.022.
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